Against the background of a conventionalist theory, and staged as a defense of a naturalistic notion of names and naming, the critique of language developed in Plato's Cratylus does not only propose that human language, in contrast to the language of the gods, is bound to the realm of myth and lie. The dialogue also concludes by offering a set of reasons to think that knowledge of reality is not within the reach of our words. Interpretations of the dialogue's long etymological sections often neglect this critique and tend to end up with an overly optimistic assessment of the theory of language on offer. In the light of one of the dialogue's central etymological accounts -Socrates' etymology of the name Hermes -this paper discusses two recent and influential versions of such a view: David Sedley's theory of onomatopoetic encapsulation and Franco Trivigno's qualified referentialism. It argues that the complex relation between language and reality expressed in the Cratylus cannot be exhaustively captured by either of these theories because Plato considers all names to be semantically underdetermined until they are put to use. It suggests that Plato rather works with a functionalistic notion of names and naming, and that the dialogue's account of natural and correct naming is to be understood in these terms.
Introduction
At 407e5-408b3 in Plato's Cratylus, Socrates offers an etymological account of the name Hermes. Hermes, we learn, means contriver of speech, and as such the name pertains to the power of language. Although this passage has not been given proper attention in the literature 1 , it is important for at least three reasons. First, it explicitly thematizes the Cratylus' main subject matter: language and the function of names. Second, it elucidates the joke that both initiates and concludes the dialogues' discussion of the correctness of names, i.e. why
Cratylus claims that Hermogenes is wrongly named. And third, it is crucial for understanding what hides behind the main controversy of recent scholarship, that is, whether Socrates' etymologies in the Cratylus are meant to be serious or if their seriousness should rather be understood in the light of a larger parodic strategy.
2
As a closer analysis of Socrates' etymology of the name Hermes will help to unravel, this controversy does to a large extent build on an unwarranted interpretative optimism in the sense that it is assumed that Plato makes Socrates explain how human language grants access to the truth about the existing things. On this view, much of the discussion has been about what semantic model best captures Plato's notion of names and naming. Yet, insofar as Plato does not, without careful qualification, accept the premise that reality can be elucidated by our words, the discussion may seem to be somewhat confused. What is needed, and what I will try to offer in this paper, is an assessment of Plato's explicit critique of language and an account of names and naming in the light of this critique.
In order to reach this end, I proceed as follows.
In section one, I analyze the dialogue's concluding claim that knowledge of reality is beyond the reach of language. In section two, I
discuss two recent and influential interpretations of the Cratylus that contend that Plato holds the opposite view: David Sedley's and Franco Trivigno's. Finally, in section tree, I offer a detailed analysis of Socrates' etymology of the name Hermes, and conclude by arguing that its emphasis on the (i) commercial, (ii) thievish and (iii) deceptive characteristics of language substantially qualifies the views of Sedley and Trivigno. of original name-makers. 6 Even if it is not obvious whether we should understand these namemakers and their originality in a literal or a metaphorical sense, their argumentative function is sufficiently clear. When the names were once established (ἐτίθεντο), they were established in accordance with the name-makers' conception of reality (436b5-7). But, as Socrates now points out, because we cannot know whether they had things right, we must be cautious. Even if the names that they established perfectly correspond to reality as they understood it, we will repeat their (possible) mistakes if we follow them (436b9-11). Cratylus is not convinced.
Surely, he says, the original name-makers knew what they were talking about. A name, he insists, is only a name if it is correct, and because the names are consistent or in harmony (σύμφωνος, 436c4) it is clear that they pick out what is real. Insofar as the names agree with one another in the way they mirror reality, this is proof (τεκμήριον) enough, he says, that the name-makers "did not miss the truth" (436c3). Thus articulating what could be said to be a strong version of a conventionalist's account modeled in naturalist's terms, Cratylus draws on the seemingly consistent results of Socrates' preceding etymological investigation. As
Cratylus insists, Socrates' analysis of the names has shown that they all tend in the same direction. Most, or at least a majority, of the etymologies revealed a general Heracleitian propensity. They showed that things are in motion. Accordingly, the names seem to support each other and as such they make up a coherent and sufficiently unified whole. The names,
Cratylus insists, were all "formed with the same method and with the same end in view" (436c5-6).
Second, Socrates replies by pointing out that consistency is no guarantee for truth: "If the givers of names erred in the beginning", he says, "and henceforth forced all other names into agreement with his initial error, there is nothing strange about that" (436c8-d1). Further, Socrates doubts that there is such a consistency at all. In order to substantiate this claim, he returns to one of the names of his etymological excursion: ἐπιστήμη (knowledge). Earlier he had shown that ἐπιστήμη has to do with how "a soul that is worthy, follows (ἕπεται) the movement of things [and that one thus] ought to insert an ε and make the name ἑπεϊστήμη" (412a1-4). Now, however, Socrates argues that it would be equally sound to think that ἐπιστήμη "signify that it sets (ἵστημι) the soul upon the things, rather than carrying it along with them, so that it is more correct to say the beginning [i.e. ἐπι] as we do now, rather than inserting an ε to make ἑπεϊστήμη" (437a2-7). 7 As it turns out, these equally sound-sounding etymologies contradict one another and this indicates that this name really is quite ambiguous (ἀμφίβολος, 437a3) . In effect, Socrates concludes, "I think we could, if we took pains, find many other words which would lead us to reverse our judgment and believe that things were not in progress or in motion, but at rest" (437c5-8). Not even the fact that most names seem to indicate that reality is in motion will do, we learn, because the truth of reality cannot be a matter of counting votes (437d3-4). Cratylus consents.
Third, as Socrates returns to Cratylus' claim that the original name-makers knew what they were talking about, he raises another doubt. How, he asks, did the original name-makers acquire their knowledge "if things cannot be learned except through their names" (438b7-8)?
Conscious of the marvelous force of Socrates' question, Cratylus answers that the "power which gave the first names to things is more than human, and therefore the names are correct"
(438c2-4). Socrates worries that this superhuman origin cannot be true. Referring back to
Cratylus' consent to the conclusion that many of the names have ambiguous and contradictory meanings, Socrates asks about Cratylus' opinion: "Then, in your opinion, he who gave the names, though he was a spirit (δαίμων) or a god (θεός), would have given names which made him contradict himself?" (438c5-6). Cratylus cannot of course consent to this. He cannot allow that what is divine contains a contradiction. And even if Cratylus goes on to suggest that it would thus perhaps only be one half of the names that are correct, Socrates repeats his point about the votes and Cratylus realizes that the matter is not to be determined by mere numbers. Accordingly, Cratylus is also forced to go along as Socrates puts the final nail in the coffin. Insofar as the same name says both this and that, we need some other point of reference and this cannot be a name:
What other way is left by which you could expect to know them [sc. τὰ ὄντα]? What other than the natural and the straightest way, through each other, if they are akin, and through themselves? For that [sc. the names] which is other and different from them would signify (σημαίνοι) not them, but something other and different (438e5-9).
Language is no short-cut to reality. While the names signify themselves and their own different meanings, it is only the things that signify the things. As such, this passage is also in line with the general orientation of Socrates' arguments in this section. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 trusted, first, because it is a mistake to think that the names contain infallible information about reality, second, because the names do not have divine origin, and third, then, because the names signify something different than the things and can therefore not be trusted to refer to some determined part of reality except than to themselves.
II. The Mirror of Reality
Socrates' argument at the end of the Cratylus does, of course, raise serious semantic and epistemic problems. Read in isolation, it does not only leave the basic function of names and naming unexplained. As such, it also sanctions the view that all linguistic expressions are inadequate and deceptive. Perhaps it is for these reasons that many readers of the Cratylus often favor other parts of the dialogue. In the longer etymological sections, for example, or in the introductory treatment of names and naming, Plato may be said to presents a much more optimistic view. The question is how these passages are to be reconciled. which from the start is isomorphic with the structure of reality" (2007, 223) . According to Sedley, it is also this isomorphic structure that justifies the science of the etymologists; in the defense of which he claims that the Cratylus was written in the first place. Endowed with the ability to decode a reality encapsulated in the basic constituents of our languages, Sedley contends that Plato thinks that the etymologists can reveal the truth hidden in the names. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 is clearly aware of this problem (cf. 2003, 37-38) and despite Trivigno's detailed and sharp critique, a closer look will reveal that they have much in common.
Most notably, as we shall see, they both seem to believe that Plato's purpose with the Cratylus is to offers a coherent and exhaustive theory of how language can capture or mirror reality. While Sedley argues that this is a matter of encapsulating the truth of the existing things in the sounds and letters of the names, Trivigno suggests that it is a matter of a structure of reference and that this pertains to the ability to denominate real and stable things.
As we have seen, and as shall become more evident as we go along, Plato's text indicates that there is no such theory on offer and that the dialogue's purpose is to be sought elsewhere (439b4-8). But why, then, do both Sedley and Trivigno claim the opposite? Let us take a closer look.
Sedley's claim that Plato thinks that the nature of human language can be exhausted in terms of its ability to capture or mirror reality can be said to be substantiated in three ways.
He argues (i) that the names "encapsulates the nature" (2007, 216) of the things, (ii) that the names, on Plato's account, must to some extent be considered to have "superhuman" origin (cf. 1998, 144) , and (iii) that in consequence of the impact of "generations of use" (2003, 48) the names have been distorted, and the task of the etymologist is to clarify these distortions and adequately decipher the original names and their meaning.
First, with reference to Socrates' introductory account of names and naming (385e-390e), Sedley argues that "a name is an expertly crafted tool for objective ontological analysis" (1998, 141) . A name is not an arbitrary collection of sounds or letters, but an independent and self-contained encapsulation of the nature of the thing it names. According to Sedley, a name must accordingly satisfy two criteria: "[A]ny unified string of sounds that (a) has been assigned to a thing and (b) descriptively picks that thing out qualifies as a name" (2007, 218) . Sedley explains what this requires in terms of the original name-makers. "Their construction", he argues, "involved subtle compression of a whole message into just as few syllables" (2007, 216) . Accordingly, a name can be understood as a cipher or a code that, correctly deciphered, can be shown to capture the nature of the thing it was originally designed to denominate.
One important thing to keep in mind here is that although the names thus construed are region, language or dialect specific, there is a mediating factor that conditions the construction. As Sedley correctly points out, there can be "two or more names for the same thing -as indeed, at least across languages, there undeniably is" (2007, 218 Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 name-Form. In order to encompass Socrates' claim that the correctness of a name should ultimately be judged in accordance with its use and function, and thus independent of specific sounds (cf. 390c-d), Sedley argues that we must assume that there is an immaterial and real name that informs the embodied names, i.e. the ones with sounds or letters.
Sedley argues that these immaterial name-Forms do not only have the same origin as the other Forms (cf. 439b10-d1 and onwards). They are also somehow metaphysically bound to the things they name (Sedley 2003, 82n13 (2003, 66; 2007, 219) . This embodiment can be more or less comprehensive, but in order to be correct it must always, at a minimum, express some aspect of the name-Form, and thus indirectly of the reality which this name-Form is a name of (2003, 83) . In this way it is also clear that the same name-Form can be expressed by different sounds and, in effect, in different languages. Sedley puts it in this way: "Just as the precise wood or metal used by an ordinary manufacturer may vary without determent to his product, so the sound system in which the name-maker creates names will vary according to his nationality" (2003, 66 Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 -9471.v10i1p26-58 (2003 manage to show that "one can use etymology to make names mean anything whatever one wants" (54). Trivigno also shows how etymology, at best, can "reveal the belief of the etymologist projected onto the names and thus back onto the original name-makers" (59).
Besides referring to Socrates' repeated point that he is not committed to the etymologies he articulates (e.g. 391a4-6, 396d4-8, 396d8-397a1; cf. 413d7-8, 428a1-3, 428d2), Trivigno defends this view with reference to 414d7-9 where Socrates puts it in the following way: "If we are allowed to add or subtract whatever we want to names, then it will be far too easy and we would be able to fit every name to every thing" (52). Reading this passage as an explicit renunciation of the etymological method Socrates actually practices in the Cratylus, Trivigno argues that large parts of the Cratylus must be understood as parody.
Instead of revealing what the original name-makers understood of the world, as Sedley has it, In the light of Trivigno's general interpretative strategy, his account of the Cratylus is quite different from Sedley's. If we take a closer look at the details, however, there are several factors that make their accounts importantly similar. Not only do they both contend that Plato considers language a mirror of reality. Just as Sedley, Trivigno also confirms this contention in terms of the (i) independent, (ii) superhuman and (iii) truth revealing capacity of the names:
10 In the days of the sophists, when etymology was "a flourishing activity" as Sedley 2007, 217 puts it, this strategy would perhaps seem more urgent than today. 11 Trivigno 2012, 44-45 , draws the parallel to Aristophanes and the Clouds. Here, Trivigno argues, just as in the Cratylus, the absurdities are not only slowly augmented. Ultimately they are also explicitly pointed out. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 First, in line with the general direction of Sedley's argument, Trivigno correctly considers Socrates' initial account of the names and their function (386e-391b) to be "quite serious" (43). In contrast to Sedley, he does however not think that this means that the "correctness of a name consists in its constituents, i.e. syllables and letters, being naturally suited to refer to the object in question" (43). According to Trivigno, "the correctness of a name [does instead] consist in its referring to a stable nature" (43).
In order to vindicate this claim Trivigno refers to 393d1-4 (43). Here, Socrates does not only claim that "it makes no difference whether the same letters or different ones signify (σημαίνει) the same thing". Socrates also suggests that it does not "matter if some letter is added or subtracted, as long as the essence (οὐσία) of the thing expressed (δηλουμένη) by the name is in control". 12 Trivigno takes this passage to be an explicit rejection of Sedley's claim that the names' letters and sounds are encoded encapsulations of descriptive contents. In addition, yet in sharp contrast to what Socrates argues at 438e5-9, Trivigno also takes this passage to be an unambiguous endorsement of the idea that a name can refer to a stable nature and signify something real (44). Drawing on an important but highly contested passage in
Socrates' account of the function of the names, Trivigno reaches this conclusion by the method of elimination:
At 387d4-5 Socrates says that "we must name things in a natural way for them to be
named and with what is natural for naming them". 13 According to Trivigno this can be taken to mean at least two things. It can mean (1) that the names are natural and correct by referring to stable natures, (2) that the names are natural and correct if their sounds and letters are "naturally suited to refer to the object in question" or both (44). Since Trivigno takes Socrates to be rejecting (2), he concludes that (1) must be the right interpretation. And indeed, as
Trivigno reaches this conclusion, he also argues that it is in terms of establishing trustworthy references that we should understand Socrates' description of the process of name-formation.
Besides the skill of the name-makers and the regulatory supervision of the dialecticians (to which we shall have reasons to return), Trivigno points out that this process "involves appealing to each thing's natural name for guidance" (43). 14 Although he does not elaborate the point, this concession is important for two reasons. First, it helps to explain how 12 Trivigno's translation and parentheses.
13 Cf. Sedley 2003, 82-83 & 60-61; Gonzales 1998, 68-69; Sallis 1974, 208. 14 Emphasis added. First, Socrates himself goes to great lengths to point out that the beliefs of the original namemakers are not necessarily to be trusted (e.g., 429a-b). How is one to discern, in advance of possessing knowledge of X, that the name-makers correctly encoded 'X', and thus that decoding 'X' will lead one to a philosophically correct view? In order to find a reason to pursue the etymology of 'X', one would need independent knowledge of X, which would thereby render the etymology superfluous. Thus, we seem to have a positive reason not to decode names, but rather to seek independent knowledge of X. Here Trivigno says at least two things. On the one hand, he says that Socrates does not think that the original name-makers had access to any privileged information, and, on the other, that even if they had, etymology is not the best way to access that information.
"Indeed", Trivigno goes on, "given the endemic ambiguity of names (437a-d) and the unreliability of those who set them down (436b-e), names will never be more than imperfect guides to the metaphysics of the universe" (70). As it turns out, Trivigno's claim that the names are imperfect is however quite modest. Because when used in the right way, as it puts it, they can indeed help us to uncover reality. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 to have privileged access to the things themselves, i.e. the referents. He also considers dialectic to be an instrumental pursuit.
Although Trivigno mentions the importance of the interpersonal character of dialectic (69-70), his account assumes that the dialecticians know what is real and that they can communicate this knowledge. The dialecticians, as Trivigno puts is, "will be able to teach and divide being" (70). They will be able to teach and "divide things according to how they are"
(43) and the names, he insists, "will not accomplish this task on their own" (70). etymological investigation of the names of the gods: the etymology of the name Hermes (Ἑρμῆς). Having just explained to Hermogenes that he is afraid to pursue these matters (407d6-9), Socrates nevertheless agrees to risk one more on the grounds that it has to do with Hermogenes name. Socrates spells it out in the following way:
Well, the name 'Hermes' (Ἑρμῆς) seems to have something to do with language (ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι). And to be an interpreter (τὸ ἑρμηνέα εἶναι), a messenger (τὸ ἄγγελον), to be thievish (καὶ τὸ κλοπικόν), deceptive in speech (καὶ τὸ ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις), and to be a wheeler-dealer (καὶ τὸ ἀγοραστικόν) -all this activity involves the power of language (περὶ λόγου δύναμίν ἐστιν). Now, as we mentioned before, to talk (εἴρειν) means to use language (λόγου χρεία ἐστί); and the other part of the name says -as Homer often does -contrived (ἐμήσατο), which means to device (μηχανᾶσθαι). And it was out of these two words that the lawgiver [or name-maker] established the name of the god who devised speech and language, since to talk (εἴρειν) means the same as to speak (λέγειν). It's just as if he told us: "Humans, it would be right for you to call the god who has contrived speech (τὸ εἴρειν ἐμήσατο) Eiremes (εἰρέμης)." But we, beautifying the name, as we suppose, call him Hermes (407e5-408b3).
This goes back to 398d6-8, to Socrates' etymology of the name hero (ἥρως) and to an account that equated the wisdom of the rhetoricians with that of the dialecticians. 18 There we learned that εἴρειν (to talk) means the same as λέγειν (to speak) and this, as our present passage makes plain, involves the use of language (λόγος). By combining εἴρειν with ἐμήσατο, the aorist of μήδομαι (plan and do cunningly), which according to Socrates means to contrive or to devise (μηχανᾶσθαι) 19 , we get εἰρέμης. This word has however been modified and ended up as Ἑρμῆς. 20 In order to prepare the ground for these derivations, 18 At 398d6-8 Socrates suggests that the word ἥρως means that the heroes "were wise and clever orators and dialecticians (σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες καὶ δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοί) […] for εἴρειν is the same as λέγειν". 19 At 415a4-9 μηχανή gets its own explanatory etymology, the etymology that Socrates calls the head (κορυφή) of them all! It means "ἄνειν ἐπὶ πολύ (much accomplishment); for μῆκος (length) has about the same meaning as τὸ πολύ (much), and the name μηχανή is composed of these two, μῆκος and ἄνειν". 20 For a slightly different account, see Ewegen 2014, 45-49 . Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Socrates begins by articulating a set of general observations. Besides the less controversial point that language has with interpretation and messaging to do 21 , he also isolates and identifies three more puzzling characteristics pertaining to Hermes and the power of language.
Language has to do with being commercial (ἀγοραστικόν), with being thievish (κλοπικόν) and it apparently involves deception in speech (ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις). Why? Let us take a look at these characteristics, one at a time.
(i) Correctness and Commerce Although this joke undeniably trades on Hermogenes' lack of money, it also makes another, more subtle, point. There is something absurd about the jokes' presuppositions.
Beside the fact that the name itself would not have been able to pick out Hermogenes as an individual even if he would have been a good wheeler-dealer, 25 it is also clear that both
Socrates and Cratylus manage to understand who they are talking about. In this light, the absurdity shines forth. Hermogenes' name does not contain sufficient descriptive information in itself to pick him out, yet they both know who they are talking about. It is absurd, then, to think, as Cratylus' joke presupposes, that the value or correctness of a name can be appreciated independent of its use.
Accordingly, Socrates' account of Cratylus' joke makes two points. On the one hand, it shows that in actual practice is it absurd to think that Hermogenes' name is correct only if he can display the characteristics that his name could be said to describe. On the other hand, it also shows that if Cratylus' joke is to make sense, it must be presupposed that a name is a self-sustained and independent commodity, in the sense that its value, as a name, is userindependent. On this account, and just as any commodity, a name is assumed to be able to change hands without any loss of content or meaning. When Socrates observes that one of the distinguishing characteristics of language is its commercial (ἀγοραστικόν) nature, it is supposedly something like this he has in mind. Language, evidenced by Cratylus' position and joke, is not resilient enough to resist the commodification of its names. However absurd a closer inspection may make it seem, this is nothing out of the ordinary. We often think that names or words can maintain their meaning and value independent of the different situations they are to function in. But this, of course, does not make it true. And there are several reasons to think that Socrates' introductory conversation with Hermogenes offers an alternative account and a different model of explanation.
Culminating at around 390c3, Socrates suggests that the natural correctness of the names must be judged in terms of use. As we shall see, this means that neither the idea of an independent capacity to encapsulate descriptive content nor the idea that the names have the power to refer to ultimate reality are sufficient, or even necessary, explanations of what it means for a name to be correct. Instead, it is the name's ability to function in its specific 25 So Gonzales 1998, 71. context that decides its correctness, because it is only the users of the names that can determine their aptitude.
Socrates' argument to this end sets out as a refutation of the conventionalist position ascribed to Hermogenes. 26 Based on the assumption "that as things seem to each, so they also are" 27 this Protagorean view contends that the correctness of a name is whatever each individual person says it is: "whatever name one gives to a thing is its right name" (384d2-3).
In order to show that this cannot be the case, Socrates starts in the familiar and asks if
Hermogenes thinks that there are good and bad people. Hermogenes answers that he certainly does. "And", Socrates goes on, "are the very good very wise and the very bad very foolish?" (386b10-12). Again Hermogenes agrees. This, Socrates concludes, is enough; because insofar as it is unlikely that all men share the same believes, one cannot at the same time think that things are to each as they seem, and that some have it wrong (386d2-6). Instead, Socrates suggest, Hermogenes' consent has other implications. If one is to maintain that there are both wise and ignorant people, one must also accept that "things (τὰ πράγματα) have some stable being (οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν) of their own" (386e1-2). The being of the things do not depend on us, "nor [are they] caused by us" (386e2). As Hermogenes agrees also to this, Socrates goes on to apply this principle to three cases: action, speaking and naming. Just as the things, Socrates argues, each action has its own stable being. And since speech is a part of action, and naming a part of speech, the principle also applies to naming. 28 The act of naming or name-use (not to be confused with name-making) is not to each what they find fit. Instead, it has its own distinct nature.
With this established, Socrates is ready to spell out the consequences: As it comes to naming, it is reasonable that we "name things in a natural way for them to be named and with what is natural for naming them" (387d4-5 analogy. Just as the carpenters make the shuttles to be used in weaving, so do the lawmakers make the names to be used in naming. And just as in the case of the shuttles, the names must be made in accordance with the function that they are supposed to have in each specific context.
[I]t seems that there is a form of shuttle that is naturally suited to each type of weaving. And the same holds of tools in general (389d1-2).
Depending on the tool's function, it has a specific form (εἶδος). In naming, this form corresponds to the individual name's specific function; and it is in terms of this function-form that the name-makers' ability must be judged. 29 Here, I take τῆς οὐσίας to parallel τὰ πράγματα, used a few lines above (386e1). Both are said to be stable, but none of them are used in any stronger technical sense. Presumably, Socrates is not talking about the Forms. As the examples of cutting, burning and weaving make clear, the stability at stake is not exclusive to superhuman reality. For the view that Socrates has a different priority and that he wants to say that the real function of the names is to describe ultimate reality and that teaching is subordinate to this function, see Sallis 1974, esp.208 Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 On this basis, then, you will judge the lawgiver [or name-maker], whether he be here or in foreign land, so long as he gives each thing the proper form of the name (τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος), in whatsoever letters" (390a4-6).
As we saw above, it was these passages that led Sedley to introduce the concept of the name-Form. In order to encompass the claim that a naturally correct name is soundindependent ("here or in foreign land" 32 ), yet established in accordance with a Form, he saw it necessary to introduce a mediating notion that could explain how the names identify the real things. With some important reservations, Trivigno endorsed a similar account in arguing that even if it is not the sounds that carry the load, Socrates considers the names naturally correct insofar as they manifest a stable link to the Form they refer to. Now who is likely to know whether the proper form (τὸ προσῆκον εἶδος) of shuttle is embodied in any piece of wood? The carpenter who made it (ὁ ποιήσας, ὁ τέκτων) or the weaver who is to use it (ὁ χρησόμενος ὁ ὑφάντης)? (390b1-3)
Hermogenes answers that it is "the one who is to use it". It is the user that should judge whether a name is correct or not, and not the maker. Without contradicting Hermogenes, Socrates also goes on to spell out what this entails. In order to make the names 32 As we have seen, Socrates also emphasizes the fact that it does not "matter whether the same thing is signified by the same syllable or by different ones. If a letter is added or subtracted, that doesn't matter either, so long as the being of the thing is in control and is expressed in its name" (393d1-4). 33 Cf. Gonzalez 1998, 68-69 . Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 in accordance with the forms, the name-makers need to adapt their creations to the user ("ὁ χρησόμενος", 390b2-3). Here it is important to keep in mind that name-making is described as a fallible endeavor. As we shall see in some detail later down the line, and even if Socrates suggests that there is a realm of divine names, the names Socrates is talking about are made for human use. Indeed, judging from the fact that Socrates insists that the name-makers need to be supervised, he apparently does not consider name-making a divine affair. Even if each name ideally is informed by the function-form it is supposes to perform, this cannot be taken for granted. Instead, the names must be evaluated in actual practice by someone with the proper skill. Accordingly, it is also reasonable to assume that the natural correctness of the names is undetermined until they are put to use.
In the case of shuttles, for example, the weaver may discriminate the worst exemplars by sight alone, but as it comes to the subtleties, the tool must be put to the trial of use. It is the user and not the maker that is the proper judge. And as such, their judgment is also contextdependent. Depending on who is to use the name and where, it must be reevaluated. Just as a shuttle, the name must fit the situation where it is to be employed; otherwise it will not make sense. Supposedly, it is for this reason that Socrates says that the sounds and letters do not matter (393d1-4). Of course they matter, but only insofar as they are chosen with care to function in the given context. It is only in this way that a name can be said to make things manifest or clear (e.g. 393d4: δήλων). If properly used, a name may be able to communicate what its user wants it to communicate. But this depends on the name's ability to perform its specific function. Presumably, this is why Socrates articulates the name-maker analogy as he does: The carpenters, i.e. the name-makers, must have the function of weaving, i.e. nameusing, in "in view" (βλέπων, 389a7) when they make the shuttles, i.e. the names.
As this seems to suggest, then, there is no need to explain the notion of the form by appealing to the Form, except insofar as Plato always has use and function in mind when he talks about them. In referring to Socrates' shuttle analogy, Francisco Gonzalez draws a similar conclusion: "[T]his analogy is of extreme importance in showing that the nature of a name is to be found in its use" (1998, 68) . Insofar as Gonzales is right, as I think he is, this has two implications. First, it means that the natural correctness of the names is not a matter of the names' ability to encapsulate descriptive contents in their sounds and letters. , v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 , v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 it also means that the natural correctness of the names is not determined by their inherent or independent ability to refer to some transcendent reality. The names, it seems, are not to be understood as independent and self-sustained entities at all. A name can certainly have a referent and refer to some specific phenomena (even if it cannot encapsulate it), but this capacity of referring is not contained in the name itself, but in its use and function.
(ii) Origin and Theft
The second characteristic that Socrates' etymology of the name Hermes associates with language is that it is thievish (κλοπικόν). Why? This, it seems, may be a question of origin. As we have seen, Socrates' etymology of his name suggests that Hermes is the contriver of speech and language and here, it seems, we face to two alternatives. Either
Hermes is the originator of the language of the gods or he is the creator of human language and thus to be identified with the lawgivers, or both. As one commentator has pointed out though, since the language of the gods contains no falsehood, it may seem more likely that "Hermes, with his propensity to theft and deceit, is mythically identified with the original lawgiver who instituted human speech" (Sallis 1975, 253) . 35 The truth of such a mythical identification cannot perhaps be ultimately settled, but it is nevertheless possible to draw one reasonable conclusion. Even if the origin of divine language is unclear, ours is not: Human language was contrived by a thief and it inherited its contriver's characteristic. 36 But what, then, are we to make of this?
As has been persuasively argued by Andrea Nightingale (2003) , one of the most important messages that the Cratylus is meant to deliver is that human language has a propensity for theft. 37 Evidenced by how Cratylus steals Socrates' words in articulating his naturalist position, and by how Socrates' traces his own words back to an external origin, Nightingale shows the way in which the Cratylus dramatizes the notion of language with can have different appearances, a true doctor can see that they have the same powers. The same goes for names: "[In] Astyanax and Hector, none of the letters is the same, except t, but nevertheless they have the same meaning. And what letters has Archepolis (ruler of the city) in common with them? Yet it means the same thing; and there are many other names which mean simply king" (493b6-c4). 35 So also Ewegen 2014, 40. 36 On Hermes as the god of thieves, see Brown, N.O, 2012 , Hermes The Thief: The Evolution of A Myth, Literary Licensing. 37 Nightingale uses the terms 'borrow', but I think 'steal' and 'theft' is more on target, since there is no consent involved. So I think this is our duty: we ought today to make use of this wisdom [i.e. the inspiration] and finish the investigation of names, but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we will conjure it away and purify ourselves, when we have found someone, whether priest or sophist, who is skilled in that kind of purifying (396d8-397a1).
As Nightingale suggests, Socrates' claim that his soul has been possessed by Euthyphro is "deeply ironic" and "Socrates is not endorsing the discourse that he is borrowing and reproducing" (2003, 232) . In line with its Hermogenic origin, Socrates is instead articulating a view that he has stolen from someone else. All of his attempts to uncover the ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 genuine properties of the names, are based on a view that is not his own. The Heracleitian tendency of Socrates' etymologies is no less proof of this than his explicit claim that he does not even believe himself.
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My excellent Cratylus, I myself have been marveling (θαυμάζω) at my own wisdom (τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ σοφίαν) all along, and I cannot believe in it (ἀπιστῶ). So I think we ought to reexamine my utterances. For to deceive oneself is the worst of all deceptions (τὸ γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ πάντων χαλεπώτατον). How can it help being terrible, when the deceiver (ὁ ἐξαπατήσων) is always present and never stirs from the spot? So I think we must turn back repeatedly to what we have said and must try, as the poet says, to look "both forwards and backwards" (428d1-8).
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As M. M. Mackenzie (1986, 128) evasiveness. Instead he is deeply impressed:
And so, Socrates, your oracular utterances seem to me to be much to my mind (ἐπιεικῶς φαίνῃ κατὰ νοῦν), whether you are inspired by Euthyphro or some other Muse has dwelt within you all along without our knowing it (428c5-7).
However ironic it may seem, Cratylus' is no better himself and when he here near the end of the dialogue finally begins to talk, it become clear that also his position is stolen. It all starts to unravel at 429b12 where Socrates sets out to interrogate Cratylus. Socrates wants to examine if Cratylus agrees to the naturalist theory of names that Socrates so-far has been propounding, and to reach this end he again asks the question that initiated the dialogue: How about the name Hermogenes, "shall we say that it is not his name at all, unless he belongs to the race of Hermes, or that it is his name, but is incorrect?" (429b12-c2). I think, Cratylus answers, that it is not his name at all (429c3-5).
There are three statements in connection to Socrates' (re)examination of this answer that are telling: First, at 429a1, Cratylus claims that the original name-makers were lawgivers (νομοθέται). As we have seen, this is a notion that Socrates introduced at 389a2 to fill a certain specific function. Cratylus does not make any comments about this, but swallows the notion whole and reuses it without hesitation. Second, at 434d9-13, Cratylus repeats Socrates'
claim from 414c4-d6, where he argued that the etymological science may sometimes need to add or remove letters in order to get at the original construction -a trick that Socrates then however immediately claimed would result in the fact that "we would be able to fit every word to every thing" (414d7-9). 39 Third, at 435d4, Cratylus claims that the function of the names is to teach (διδάσκειν), a function that Socrates introduced at 388b13 in order to argue that the natural correctness of a name is to be understood in terms of its use.
In the light of these passages, Nightingale concludes that "[Cratylus'] language seems in some way not to be 'in himself'". Cratylus voice is not his own and " [t] he most obvious illustration of this notion is the fact that his views are put in the mouth of Socrates, who, in turn, ascribes them to Euthyphro" (2003, 231) . But why, then, Nightingale goes on, did
Socrates not prevent this from the beginning? Why did he not make Cratylus state his own case at the outset? As we know from other dialogues, this would not be unsocratic behavior.
Nightingale's explanation is as important as it is telling. What Socrates is doing is that he "mimics and mocks Cratylus' evasiveness". In order to illustrate "the dangers of borrowed When Plato makes Socrates say that one of the central characteristics of language is its thievish nature, it is presumably something like this he has in mind.
In contrast to what we could imagine as a philosophical ideal, where all of our thoughts and words emerge from reason and rational deliberation, human language cannot guarantee such an etiology. In and of itself, it cannot guarantee a genuine and true source. Socrates' distinction at 408c5-8 between the language of the gods and the language of humans also confirms and expands this point.
Not only does Socrates explicitly argue that divine language, in contrast to human, is always true. As we shall now see in some detail, he also claims that this makes our situation rather tragic. 39 Trivigno's translation. Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 (iii) Deception and Dialectic
This brings us to the third characteristic that Socrates associates with the power of language and to the relation of Hermes and his "deception in speech (ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις)" (408a1). 40 The etymology of the name itself (that Ἑρμῆς comes from εἴρειν and ἐμήσατο)
contains no further information that may explain this characterization. But Socrates' subsequent remarks about the name of a related god do.
Pan (Πάν), Socrates explains, is the son of Hermes. And Pan, is "either speech (λόγος) or the brother of speech", for "that brother resembles brother is not at all surprising" (408d2-4). As such, Socrates goes on, we are not only dealing with everything (τὸ πᾶν), because language or speech means everything ("ὁ λόγος τὸ πᾶν σημαίνει"), this is also a twofold (διπλόος) phenomenon (408c2-3). As language makes all things circle around ("κυκλεῖ καὶ πολεῖ ἀεί", 408c2-3), it has both a true and a false ("ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδής", 408c3) part. The true part resides up among the gods ("ἄνω οἰκοῦν ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς", 408c6), while the false part dwells below among the human multitude ("κάτω ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων", 408c6-7).
In contrast to the smooth and divine ("λεῖον καὶ θεῖον", 408c5) nature of true speech, the false part is rough, goatish and tragic ("τραχὺ καὶ τραγικόν", 408c7). 41 In contrast to the language of the gods, Socrates explains, our language pertains to the tragic life ("περὶ τὸν τραγικὸν βίον", 408c8) and is full with tales and falsehoods ("οἱ μῦθοί τε καὶ τὰ ψεύδη", 408c8).
Socrates justifies these claims and the distinction between divine and human language by reference to Pan and the etymology of his name. Pan or the personified all ("ὁ πᾶν"), just like speech, informs (μηνύων) and always moves around ("ἀεὶ πολῶν", 408c10) and is thus "rightly called goat-herd (αἰπόλος)" (408d1, emphasis added). Socrates does not elaborate on how this sound-similarity can justify the analogy, but he is nevertheless not reluctant to continue the comparison. As the double-natured (διφυής, 408b8) son of Hermes, Pan is smooth in his upper parts ("τὰ μὲν ἄνωθεν λεῖος") and rough and goat-like in his lower parts ("τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τραχὺς καὶ τραγοειδής", 408c10-d2). And since it shall come as no surprise that brother resemble brother, Socrates' distinction between the true language of the gods and the deceptive and tragic language of humans, may seem to be vindicated.
Even if a reader may not be fully satisfied with this explanation, it makes its point.
Because, as it seems reasonable to believe, it is in the light of the distinction here established that Socrates' talk about deception in speech ("ἀπατηλὸν ἐν λόγοις", 408a1) should be seen.
As Rachel Barney (2001, 79) has perceptively pointed out, human language is permeated by the possibility of deceptions and misunderstandings, because we "mistake one kind of language for the other, since both kinds look alike". Supposedly, it is also this that makes our situation tragic. For us it seems as if both kinds of speech, both the rough and the smooth, do the same things: they both inform about everything and make this information circle around.
But humanity has no access to the realm above. We only have lies and myths. "As a result", Barney goes on, "we habitually mistake the lower discourse for the higher, and take its objects to be the true realities" (2001, 79) . Without the ability to see the bigger picture, we are caught in the web of our own words. And since these words give the appearance of being similar to the words of the gods, we are blinded by their deceptive light. Not only do we believe that our language, like the language of the gods, can be true and smooth. This mistake also makes our situation rough and tragic. Even if it is doubtful that Plato shares all aspects of our modern notion of tragedy, he does seem to acknowledge the frustration and inevitable failure that it involves.
The idea that the true part of speech is only accessible to the gods is also emphasized as Socrates introduces his etymological enterprise at the outset. In lack of money, and having just explained to Hermogenes that the best information about language and names should be bought from the sophists, Socrates offers a way out. He turns to the free information to be found in Homer. Homer, he says, says many great and wonderful ("μέγα τι καὶ θαυμάσιον") things about language and the correctness of names (391d6), and he often distinguishes between how humans and gods talk: In contrast to the names we are using, the names used by the gods are always correct (391d8). The river that humans call Scamander (Σκάμανδρον), for example, should really be called Xanthus (Ξάνθον), and even if we call the bird cymindis (κύμινδις) the correct and divine name is chalcis (χαλκίδα).
As Socrates sets out on his etymological enterprise he does however leave little room for doubt. The names he is talking about are human. Even if Homer seems to offer the opportunity to investigate the names that the gods are using, Socrates makes it clear that "these things are probably greater than what you and I can discover (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως μείζω ἐστὶν ἢ κατ᾽ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἐξευρεῖν)" (392b1-2). Anticipating his subsequent distinction between human and divine language, Socrates' avoids discussing the names made for gods.
For even if Homers' language appears to contain "great and wonderful information about the Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 correctness of names" (391d6-7), this is not something that Socrates considers to be within his reach. Instead he goes on to look at the names made for men and nothing else.
Insofar as Socrates' distinction between divine and human language has any bearing, this has several consequences. Not only does it imply that the human part of Hermes' offspring has not inherited any of his divine characteristics. It also implies that our human language lacks the capacity to carry hidden divine information. 42 In line with the human orientation of Socrates' investigation of the names, we are left on our own. As such, this also implies that insofar as we do not properly assess the limited scope of what we can say and do with words, we are caught in a frustrated and tragic situation. Through the false appearance of being an all-encompassing medium for the circulation of information about everything, our language becomes a mirage. It disorients us in the quest for truth, and the deceptive resemblance between our language and that of the gods makes us think that the secrets of reality can be revealed by our names.
As we have seen, there are however scholars that defend a much more optimistic view.
Despite Socrates' explicit claim to the opposite effect at 439b4-8 ("how realities are to be learned or discovered is perhaps too great a question for you and me to determine"), Franco
Trivigno insists that the Cratylus outlines a comprehensible way in which human language can reveal the truth about reality. "There is a way", as he argues, "in which words are the path to philosophical truth" (2012, 69). According to Trivigno, when used in the right way, human language can be used to refer to the real things and this use identifies a superior type of discursive practice called dialectic. Let us take a look at how Trivigno wants this to work.
For the dialecticians, Trivigno insists, "names are subordinate to things" (2012, 70) and this ensures a path to ultimate reality. By using the names as if they refer to the real things almost directly, mediated only by the so-called natural names, Trivigno insists that "the dialectical use explicitly aims at and refers to the stable nature [s] in order to attain knowledge of them" (72). Established in a complex process that "involves appealing to each thing's natural name [or name-Form] for guidance" (43), the names in a dialectical conversation have a special status that allows them to be used in such a way that they can communicate substantial and true information about reality.
Besides the fact that Trivigno' arguments do not seem to square with Socrates' critical account of human language contained in the etymology of the name Hermes, we have also seen that there are reason to doubt that Plato endorses the notion of a natural name at all. In 42 Pace Kirkland 2008. addition, Trivigno's arguments also build on a doubtful assumption in relation to how he conceives of dialectical communication. This assumption has two aspects that both relate to its epistemic standards.
One the one hand, Trivigno suggests that even if the sounds that the dialecticians are using are arbitrary, the dialecticians' knowledge of the name-Forms and the form-Forms to which the name-Forms refer endows them with the power to avoid deception and ambiguity.
This, however, presupposes that the dialecticians already know what they, according to proper way. 43 Insofar as this includes, but is not limited to, the ability of asking and answering questions in an attentive and considerate way, this implies that the art of dialectic is conditioned both by the ability to search together (συζητεῖν, 384c2) and by what Socrates characterizes as the skill of "investigating things along with you (σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ)" (391a6). Even if this does not rule out more complex methods and principles -including, for example, the search for essences and definitions -the basics need to be established first. The skill of the dialecticians is never a matter of filling the ones they are teaching with information, but to establish a sufficient level of discursive transparency and, if possible, to advance from there.
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43 So Kirkland 2008, 11. 44 As is well known, stylometrically the Cratylus is an early dialogue, and even if the implications of this are controversial, it does say something. Dialectic in the Cratylus seems to be closer to what is outlined in the Apology than to what is discussed in the so-called later dialogues where it becomes a more and more technical notion. As Socrates suggests in the Apology (38a2-3), there is a sense in which the practice itself carries the value, independently of its possible results. For discussion of the Paulo, v.10, n.1. p. 26-58, 2016 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 IV. Conclusion
Plato's Cratylus is a deceptive dialogue. Not only does Socrates' evasive behavior make it seem more dogmatic than it is. Its proleptic design has also led many commentators to argue that its main objective is to offer an account of how language can be used to capture reality. As we have seen, there are however many passages that reveal a different purpose.
Besides Socrates' explicit argument to this effect, at the dialogue's end, the commercial, thievish and deceptive nature of human language, made explicit in Socrates' etymological account of the name Hermes, also implies, in contrary to what is often assumed, that the relation between human language and reality cannot be exhausted neither in terms of encapsulation nor in terms of reference. In addition, a closer analysis of these characteristics has also revealed that one of the dialogue's principle goals is to expose the tragedy of thinking that it can. Consequentially, we have also seen that there are good reasons to dispute three suppositions that sanction this belief: (i) that the natural correctness of the names involves the notion of a natural name or a name-Form, (ii) that the names can correlate to a transcendental source of knowledge and (iii) that the dialecticians have an exclusive knowledge of ultimate reality. Not only does Socrates' identification of the commercial aspect of human language undermine the view that the names are independent and self-sufficient entities. In addition to the functionalistic notion of names and naming offered in its place, Socrates' account of the thievish and deceptive nature of human language also shows that even if we can talk about what is grasped by a human mind and to this extent make ourselves understood, the language we are bound to use is always full of myths and lies and it is essentially disconnected from the reality of the truly existing things.
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